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Uses `repr(ip)` to safely format IP addresses when logging them in the SSRF validation block. This prevents an attacker from injecting arbitrary log entries by passing an IPv6 address with a malicious scope ID containing newline (`\n` or `\r`) characters. Co-authored-by: ManupaKDU <95234271+ManupaKDU@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Log Injection (CRLF Injection). The
ipaddressmodule permits arbitrary characters (like\rand\n) in the scope ID of an IPv6 address (e.g.fe80::1%eth0\nERROR:root:...). Since the SSRF validation block rejected these addresses but logged the untrusted input directly, an attacker could inject forged entries into application logs.π― Impact: Log forging, confusion, corruption of log-analysis systems, and potential masking of other malicious activities.
π§ Fix: Wrapped the
ipargument inrepr()before logging it to safely escape any control characters (e.g., converting\nto\nliteral). Added a regression test (test_is_reachable_ssrf_log_injection) totest_testping1.py.β Verification: Ran
python3 -m unittest test_testping1.pyand confirmed the new test passes, demonstrating the newline character is correctly escaped.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5413652337044024307 started by @ManupaKDU