build(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.7 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
hono (source)	4.12.2 → 4.12.7

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-29045

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

• Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
• Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

• Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
• Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

CVE-2026-29085

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

CVE-2026-29086

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.

GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223

Summary

When using parseBody({ dot: true }) in HonoRequest, specially crafted form field names such as __proto__.x could create objects containing a __proto__ property.

If the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, this may lead to prototype pollution in the target object.

Details

The parseBody({ dot: true }) feature supports dot notation to construct nested objects from form field names.

In previous versions, the __proto__ path segment was not filtered. As a result, specially crafted keys such as __proto__.x could produce objects containing __proto__ properties.

While this behavior does not directly modify Object.prototype within Hono itself, it may become exploitable if the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns.

Impact

Applications that merge parsed form data into regular objects using unsafe patterns (for example recursive deep merge utilities) may become vulnerable to prototype pollution.

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Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.12.7

Compare Source

Security hardening

Ignore __proto__ path segments in parseBody({ dot: true }) to prevent potential prototype pollution when merged with unsafe patterns.

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Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.6...v4.12.7

v4.12.6

Compare Source

What's Changed

• fix(accept): replace regex split to mitigate ReDoS by @​EdamAme-x in #​4758
• fix(jsx): align link hoisting and dedupe with React 19 by @​usualoma in #​4792
• chore(builld): tsconfig project references by @​BarryThePenguin in #​4797
• chore: add tsconfig.spec.json by @​yusukebe in #​4798
• feat(jsx-renderer): support function-based options by @​3w36zj6 in #​4780
• fix(lambda-edge): avoid callback handler deprecation on NODEJS_24_X by @​t0waxx in #​4782

New Contributors

• @​t0waxx made their first contribution in #​4782

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.5...v4.12.6

v4.12.5

Compare Source

What's Changed

• fix(request): return string | undefined from param() when path type is any by @​andrewdamelio in #​4723
• fix(jwt): validate token format in decode and decodeHeader functions by @​otoneko1102 in #​4752
• fix(jsx): Fix "Invalid state: Controller is already closed" by @​gaearon in #​4770
• chore(eslint): upgrade @hono/eslint-config by @​BarryThePenguin in #​4781

New Contributors

• @​andrewdamelio made their first contribution in #​4723
• @​otoneko1102 made their first contribution in #​4752
• @​gaearon made their first contribution in #​4770

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.4...v4.12.5

v4.12.4

Compare Source

Security fixes

This release includes fixes for the following security issues:

SSE Control Field Injection

Affects: streamSSE() in Streaming Helper. Fixes injection of unintended SSE fields by rejecting CR/LF characters in event, id, and retry. GHSA-p6xx-57qc-3wxr

Cookie Attribute Injection in setCookie()

Affects: setCookie() from hono/cookie. Fixes cookie attribute manipulation by rejecting ;, \r, and \n in domain and path options. GHSA-5pq2-9x2x-5p6w

Middleware Bypass in Serve Static

Affects: Serve Static middleware. Fixes inconsistent URL decoding that could allow protected static resources to be accessed without triggering route-based middleware. GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr

Users who uses Strreaming Helper, Cookie utility, and Serve Static are strongly encouraged to upgrade to this version.

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Other changes

• fix(client): preserve route schema in ApplyGlobalResponse by @​agumy in #​4777
• fix(utils/url): specify the return type of tryDecodeURI by @​yusukebe in #​4779

New Contributors

• @​agumy made their first contribution in #​4777

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.3...v4.12.4

v4.12.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

• fix(validator): prevent type diff bug in form data parsing by @​EdamAme-x in #​4753
• fix(jwt): use Math.floor instead of bitwise OR for safe timestamp by @​EdamAme-x in #​4754
• fix(jwt): fix JwtVariables for ContextVariableMap by @​yusukebe in #​4764
• fix(types): remove DOM type dependencies from ClientResponse and request method by @​YevheniiKotyrlo in #​4768
• fix(types): correct middleware types by @​hmnd in #​4774
• fix(jwt): prevent memory leak by avoiding mutation of options object by @​EdamAme-x in #​4759

New Contributors

• @​YevheniiKotyrlo made their first contribution in #​4768
• @​hmnd made their first contribution in #​4774

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.2...v4.12.3

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